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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, the Tenth Circuit addressed several issues certain to have a
major impact on the evolution of environmental law. The court considered issues arising under: (1) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), I which continues
to spawn expensive litigation as parties seek to impose financial responsibility on others for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) the Clean
Water Act (CWA),2 responsible for maintaining the integrity of the nation's waters; and (3) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),3
which mandates that federal agencies consider mitigation of adverse environmental effects before taking action.
This Article surveys select environmental cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit. Part I discusses the issue of civil suits for medical monitoring expenses under CERCLA. 4 Part II discusses to what extent the
Clean Water Act waives sovereign immunity for penalties in a civil action. 5 Part III evaluates the role of permit stipulations in an agency's
decision to incorporate a mitigation discussion into its Environmental
6
Impact Statement.
II.

A.

MEDICAL MONITORING UNDER

CERCLA:

DAIGLE V. SHELL OIL Co.

7

Background

CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, deals with the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites which pose a threat to public health and the environment. 8 The statute also provides for civil suits against the parties
responsible for the hazardous waste, imposing liability on responsible
parties for the costs of cleanup as well as "any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person." 9 At issue in Daigle was whether
provision for response costs extends to the creation of a "medical monitoring" or "medical surveillance" fund for those exposed to hazardous
waste. Such a system would detect the onset of latent diseases caused by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 and Supp. 1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
4. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). See also infra text
accompanying notes 7-73.
5. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992)(Lujan II). See also infra text
accompanying notes 74-133.
6. See Holy Cross Wilderness Fund v. Madigan, 960 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1992). See
also infra text accompanying notes 134-182.
7. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) provides for remedial action "[w]henever (A) any
hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment.., or substantial threat of release ... [of material dangerous] to the public
health or welfare ......
9. See id.§ 9607(a)(4)(B).
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0

Early Decisions

In Brewer v. Ravan, I I the federal district court for the Middle District
of Tennessee attempted to address the issue of medical monitoring
costs within the scope of CERCLA. Former employees sued a capacitor
manufacturer for exposure to contaminated soil. The defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that
CERCLA did not contemplate medical monitoring liability.' 2 The dismissal was denied. The court concluded that an action to recover costs
for assessing the effects of a release of hazardous substances was a recognizable claim under CERCLA.1 3 The court reasoned that because the
term "response costs" also included costs incurred in the removal of
toxic substances, medical testing was a legitimate cost involved in substance removal. 14 Little analysis was offered for this result other than
the definitions supplied by CERCLA which provide for removal costs
15
necessary to monitor a release.
In Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 16 the federal district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania arrived at a conclusion in direct opposition to that of the Brewer court. The Coburn court examined in detail the
response cost definitions supplied by CERCLA and considered them in
light of earlier cases on similar matters.1 7 The court began by acknowledging that CERCLA is inherently vague, finding that its definitions give
little guidance and its legislative history is equally ambiguous.' 8 The
court searched prior decisions for guidance on the matter. For example,
the Coburn court explained that, in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 19 the Supreme
Court determined that Superfund money may not be used to "compensate private parties for economic harms that result from discharge of haz'20
ardous substances."
The Coburn court also disagreed with the Brewer conclusion that
medical monitoring tests fell within the range of response costs and concluded that the costs of medical screening were not "necessary costs of
10. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532-1533. Also at issue in Daigle was the "discretionary function exception" applicable to federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence, id. at 1537-43,
and an ultrahazardous strict liability claim. Id. at 1543-45.
11. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
12. Id. at 1178.
13. Id. at 1179.
14. Id.
15. Id. (applying 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)(1988)).
16. 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988).
17. Id. at *3-*5.
18. Id. at *2-*3.
19. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
20. Coburn, 1988 WL 120739, at *3 (quoting Exxon, 475 U.S. at 375)(emphasis added)). The court contrasted this reasoning with that used in cases such as Jones v. Inmont
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984), in which medical testing apparently met the
definition of "removal" expressed in CERCLA. However, theJones court did not address
the question of whether medical monitoring was one of the possible "necessary costs of
response." Although theJones decision did not attempt to clear this confusion, it did identify the problems involved in defining response costs. Id.
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response." 2 1 The definition of the phrase merely contemplated the
cleanup of hazardous substances. 2 2 The court also noted that legislative
history showed that Congress intentionally repealed a provision to provide for recovery of medical expenses. 23 This indicated to the court that
Congress did not intend to provide for medical expenses within CER24
CLA response costs.
2.

Recent Decisions

The extensive analysis given by the Coburn court set the stage for
later decisions. Werlein v. United States 2 5 sought a monitoring fund,
based on the response costs provision, to screen for early signs of disease stemming from exposure to toxic substances. 26 The court discussed both the Brewer line of cases as well as the cases following Coburn.
The Werlein court found the Coburn line of cases persuasive, 27 and particularly emphasized the fact that CERCLA provided a medical care provision through the creation of the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR),2 8 thus showing that Congress intended the
medical costs to be provided through a separate system. 29
A federal district court in Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. so also followed the
Coburn decision by holding that CERCLA response costs did not include
provisions for medical monitoring. 3 ' The Ambrogi court recognized the
emerging trend developing a consistent manner of dealing with medical
monitoring under CERCLA. 3 2 Furthermore, the Ambrogi court asserted
that, under the CERCLA definitions, "removal" actions only applied to
activities designed to "affect the threatened release of hazardous substances." 3 3 Thus, once the release occurred, the statutory scope no
longer considered such activities covered under the definition of re34
moval actions.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. A Legislative comment shows that Congress "deleted the Federal cause of action
for medical expenses." 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
24. Coburn, 1988 WL 120739, at *6.
25. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1992).
26. Id. at 901.
27. Id. at 903.
28. Id. The Agency for Taxic Substances and Diseased Registry was established by 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988).
29. Id.
30. 750 F. Supp 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
31. Id. at 1246.
32. Id. at 1239. For a further examination of the development of medical monitoring,
see Allan Kanner, Note, Medical Monitoring.-State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL. ENvrL. L.J. 1
(1989). See also Dan A. Tanenbaum, Note, When Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public
Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 925 (1992).
33. Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
34. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531.
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Tenth Circuit Decision
1. Facts

The Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Arsenal) is a federally controlled
CERCLA site near Commerce City, Colorado. 35 In 1956, the Army began using an area on the Arsenal known as Basin F to incinerate hazardous waste materials.3 6 Shell Oil Company also used the basin to
impound wastes generated in its herbicide and pesticide production facility. 3 7 The combination of the wastes created one of the most toxic
hazardous waste sites in .the country.3 8 In 1984 the Army began a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study,3 9 under which the Army
identified Basin F as a site which needed an "Interim Response Action"
to deal with the spread of contaminants from the site. 40 During the following year the Army transferred liquid hazardous wastes to on-site
storage tanks and lined surface impoundments and moved solids into a
lined waste pile, which was capped and then covered with top soil and
41
vegetation.
During this cleanup procedure, the plaintiffs complained of noxious
odors and airborne pollutants being carried into their trailer park, located one-and-one-half miles from Basin F. 42 Residents allegedly suffered economic damage as well as a variety of physical ailments and the
possibility of more serious latent diseases. 43 Under the CERCLA provision for "response costs," plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
for the District of Colorado to establish a long-term medical monitoring
fund to detect any diseases that may be produced by exposure to the
contaminants. 4 4 Shell Oil and the United States Government moved to
dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that re45
sponse costs under CERCLA did not include medical monitoring.
The district court denied this and other motions and both parties sought
interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded, concluding that medical monitoring costs
35.

Id..

36. Id.
37. Id
38.

Id

39. Id. This study took place pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
40. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1532-33. CERCLA provides that:
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
45. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531.
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were not included under CERCLA response
2.

CoStS. 4

6

Holding

In reversing the district court's decision not to dismiss the medical
monitoring charges, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the issue centered
on the definition of "any other necessary costs of response."147 The
court decided that medical monitoring was'not included in the definition. CERCLA does not directly define this phrase, rather, it only attempts to define the word "response." A "response" is defined by
CERCLA as a removal action or a remedial action. 48 "Removal" is defined as the cleanup of already released hazardous substances from the
environment. 4 9 These actions are designed to effect an interim solution
to a contamination problem, 50 as opposed to "remedial actions," which
are designed as permanent solutions to the contamination.5 1 Implementation of remedial actions occurs instead of, or in addition to, re52
moval actions.
Plaintiffs in this case argued that a broad reading of the CERCLA
language, - "other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health" 5 3 - within the definition of "removal" suggests that removal actions do include medical monitoring
CoStS. 5 4 In support of this reading, the park residents relied primarily
on Brewer v. Ravan,55 which held that medical monitoring costs were in56
cluded under CERCLA removal and remedial costs.
The DaigLe court decided that the Brewer interpretation was too far
reaching and that the response cost provision of CERCLA did not contemplate medical monitoring costs. 57 Instead, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the analysis given in Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 5 8 which rejected the
46. Id. at 1537.
47. Id. at 1533. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
48. "The terms respond or response means [sic] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action ....
42 U.S.C. 9601(25)(1988).
49. The terms 'remove' or 'removal' means (sic] the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the
environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate
the release or threat of release of hazardous substances ....
Id. § 9601(23).
50. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533-34.
51. Id. at 1534. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988) provides:
The terms 'remedy' or 'remedial action' means [sic] those actions consistent with
permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event
of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment,
to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare
or the environment.
53. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
54. Id.
55. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
56. Id. at 1179. See also supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
57. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535-36.
58. 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988). See also supra text accompanying notes
16-24.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

Brewer analysis. In so doing, Coburn set the trend for most CERCLA
medical monitoring cases to follow. The Coburn court based its decision
on the plain meaning of the statute and concluded that CERCLA re59
sponse costs did not extend to long-term medical monitoring costs.
As had the court in Werlein v. United States,6 ° the Daigle court also
concluded that medical monitoring could not be used once a hazardous
release occurs. 6 ' Because CERCLA defined remedial actions as actions
used to prevent a release, 6 2 once a release occured, as in the Daigle case,
the scope of CERCLA response costs no longer covered the type of
63
long-term monitoring requested.
The Daigle court found support for denying the medical monitoring
action by pointing to the fact that CERCLA contains a provision for a
type of medical monitoring. 6 4 CERCLA established the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), 65 which allows individuals to petition for a health assessment and long-term health surveillance programs. 66 Despite the plaintiffs' argument that this provision
indicate that CERCLA provides for medical monitoring expenses, the
court decided that ATSDR does not extend a generalized adoption of
medical monitoring to other CERCLA provisions. 67 As grounds for this
conclusion, the court noted that the funding for ATSDR is separate
68
from the funding for response costs.
C.

Analysis

As the first federal appellate court to address directly the matter of
medical monitoring costs under CERCLA, 6 9 this case will significantly
influence future cases in other circuits. The Daigle decision adds little to
the analyses developed by the lower federal courts in Coburn and Ambrogi. The Daigle court adopted the analysis of CERCLA definitions used
by the Coburn court. This interpretation follows the structure of CERCLA and concludes that the private right of recovery for response costs
does not include a right to costs for medical monitoring. 70 The Daigle
court also adopted the analysis used by the Ambrogi court, as the circuit
court concluded that long-term medical monitoring does not prevent
59. Id. at *6.
60. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1992).
61. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
63. Id. at 1535-36.
64. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536-37.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988).
66. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
67. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537.
68. Id. For a discussion of the role of ATSDR within CERCLA as well as its many
inherent problems, see Martin R. Siegel, Integrating Public Health Into Superfund: What Has
Been the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry?, 20 ENvrz.

(1990).
69. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533.
70. Id. at 1535.

L. REP. 10013
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contact between a hazardous substance and the public. 7 1 Once a release
72
occurrs, monitoring is no longer within the scope of response costs.
While the Daigle decision may add nothing new to the trend emerging in the lower courts, it does solidify and refine the law by compiling
the persuasive arguments from prior decisions. As noted in Ambrogi, the
law on this issue is slowly developing a certain consistency. 73 The Tenth
Circuit gave the Coburn and Ambrogi decisions enough emphasis to establish a lasting degree of clarity in this previously murky area of law.
III.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER AcT:

CLUB V. LUJAN

A.

SIERRA

74
(Lujan II)

Background. Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan 1)75

The Tenth Circuit originally held in Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan I)
that the Clean Water Act (CWA) waived sovereign immunity for civil
penalties. 76 Normally, the United States is immune from any suit in the
absence of consent. A waiver of sovereign immunity "must be unequivocally expressed" by Congress. 7 7 Courts are also required to strictly
construe a waiver and not extend it beyond the language of the statute. 78 However, the CWA exposed the federal government to liability
79
through section 1323 of the Act.
Lujan I involved a citizen suit concerning alleged violations of a
CWA permit at the Leadville tunnel in Lake County, Colorado.8 0 Section 1365(a) allows citizens to bring suit against the United States for
violations of the CWA. 8 ' The statute also gives federal district courts
jurisdiction over these matters and allows them to "apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title."'8 2 The court determined that section 1319(d), which authorizes civil penalties for CWA
violations,8 3 could be applied because a permit for the tunnel had been
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
73. Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1239.
74. 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992).
75. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1429.
77. Id. at 1423 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
78. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983)).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) states that "[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality...
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of

water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity
.... (emphasis added).
80. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1422.
81. Section 1365(a)(1) allows any citizen to file suit "against any person (including (i)
the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter ....
".33
U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (1988).

82. Id. § 1365(a)(2).
83. For violations of the CWA:
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of
this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a
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issued by the EPA under section 1342.84
The court examined section 1323(a) to determine the extent to
which the federal government is liable for civil penalties. The section
states that "the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties
arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or the process of such court" 85 Finally, the court looked to
section 1362 of the CWA for the definition of "person." The section
defines person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or
'86
any interstate body."
The main issue in Lujan I was whether the term "sanctions" in the
section 1323(a) phrase "process and sanctions" encompassed "civil penalties" under Section 1319(d). 8 7 The court held that the CWA clearly
authorized courts to assess civil penalties against federal agencies, 8 8 and
decided that "sanctions" encompassed civil penalties as provided in sections 1365 and 1319.89
The United States Department of the Interior and the United States
Bureau of Reclamation 9" urged the court to view "sanctions" as including only coercive sanctions. 9 Coercive sanctions may be used to force
agency compliance with a court order.9 2 The agencies argued against
including punitive sanctions designed to punish an agency for past noncompliance. 93 However, the agencies cited only McClellan EcologicalSeepage Situation v. Weinberger9 4 to defend this position, which concluded that
Congress had not unambiguously waived sovereign immunity for punitive fines. The Lujan I court pointed out that McClellan, however, is an
isolated case and that many courts have held that the CWA does waive
95
sovereign immunity for punitive fines.
The Lujan I court also rejected the defendants' argument that the
CWA generally excludes the federal government as a person for the purpose of assessing penalties. 96 Because section 1365 states that a civil
State ... shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each
violation ....
33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
84. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1424.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 1362(5).
87. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1425.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The United States Dept. of the Interior and the United States Bureau of Reclamation jointly own and operate the Leadville tunnel and are both subject to the CWA permitting regulations. Id. at 1422.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1425.
93. Id.
94. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
95. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1425. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Il1. 1989), dismissed in part, 737 F. Supp. 51
(1990); California v. United States Dep't of Navy, 631 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd,
845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
96. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1426-27.
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suit may be brought against "any citizen (including . . . the United
States)", Congress showed an express desire to waive sovereign immu97
nity for civil actions under the CWA.
B.

Supreme Court Action

The question in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio 8 parallels the
issue in Lujan H. The state of Ohio sought punitive fines from the Department of Energy for past violations of the CWA.9 9 The lower court
held that the CWA waived sovereign immunity for punitive fines and the
Supreme Court reversed.' 0 0 The Court distinguished punitive fines
from coercive fines, holding that while the CWA waived sovereign immunity for coercive fines, '0 1 Congress did not explicitly waive sovereign
02
immunity for punitive fines.'
While the Court analyzed the same important issues as had the Lujan I court, it arrived at an opposite conclusion in each instance. The
Court found that the overall goal of the CWA excluded the United States
from the definition of "person."1 0 3 Although the section 1365 civil suit
provision of the CWA included the United States in the definition of
person, 10 4 it was not included as such in the section 1362 definition of
person, nor under the section 1323(a) federal facilities pollution control
provisions.' 0 5 The Court inferred from this that Congress intended the
United States to be deemed a person only when explicitly stated by
06
statute.'
The Court then concluded that the section 1323(a) waiver of sovereign immunity for "process and sanctions" did not include a waiver for
punitive fines. 10 7 The Court offered no persuasive authority for this
conclusion and ignored the developing trend in the lower courts to include a waiver of sovereign immunity for punitive fines.' 0 8 Nevertheless, the Court clearly stated that, through its own narrow construction
of the statute, sovereign immunity was "waiv[ed] no further than the
coercive variety."' 0 9 This ruling effectively overruled the Lujan I decision and allowed the agencies to appeal the original Tenth Circuit decision. Later, the Supreme Court vacated Lujan I and remanded for
further consideration. 110
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1427.
112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
Id. at 1632.
See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
Id. at 1634-35.
Id. at 1634.
Id.
Id.at 1635 n.14.
Id. at 1635.
Id.
Id.at 1639.
See id.
Id.
Lujan v. Sierra Club, 112 S. Ct. 1927 (1992).
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Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan II) 111
1.

Facts

The Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation own
and operate the Leadville tunnel, located in Lake County, Colorado. In
1975, the EPA issued to the Bureau of Reclamation a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 11 2 permit authorizing the discharge of pollutants. 1 13 The EPA reissued the permit several times. " 4
On January 13, 1989, the Sierra Club along with the Colorado Environmental Coalition filed a complaint in federal district court alleging
the Interior Department and Bureau of Reclamation violated the 1975
NPDES permit."15 The plaintiffs asked the court to: (1) issue a
mandatory injunction enjoining further permit violations; (2) order the
agencies to pay civil penalties; and (3) declare that the agencies were in
violation of the CWA."1 6 The defendant agencies moved to dismiss the
civil penalties claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that
the CWA did not waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties."17 The
district court denied the agencies' motion and certified the question of
civil penalties for interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 118
2.

Opinion

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit court was
forced to follow the Supreme Court analysis in United States Departmentof
Energy v. Ohio and reverse its original holding in Lujan I. The Lujan H
court reiterated the Court's arguments pertaining to the definition of
the phrase "process and sanctions." It quoted the Court's language that
"[t]he very fact.., that the [section 1323(a)] text speaks of sanctions in
the context of enforcing 'process' as distinct from substantive 'requirements' is a good reason to infer that Congress was using 'sanction' in its
coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fines."' 9
The Lujan II court next addressed the problem of the 1323(a) provision subjecting the United states to liability "only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court."12 0 While the first part of
the phrase indicates that civil penalties may also include punitive fines,
the latter part seems to deal only with fines used to enforce a court order-coercive fines. The Lujan I court followed the United States Dep't Of
111. 972 F.2d 312 (l0th Cir. 1992).
112.

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).

113. Lujan II, 972 F.2d at 313.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117.
118.
119.
(1992)).
120.

Id. at 312.
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 315 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1637
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988); Ljan H, 972 F.2d at 315.
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Energy v. Ohio analysis and resolved this tension through "the requirement that any statement of waiver be unequivocal,"' 2 ' holding that the
12 2
CWA did not waive sovereign immunity for punitive fines.
D.

Analysis

The Sierra Club attempted to distinguish United States Dep't of Energy
v. Ohio from the facts in Lujan II case by arguing that the former case
involved alleged violations of a state-issued permit' 23 while Lujan II involved a permit issued directly by the EPA.' 2 4 The Sierra Club argued
that because the permit was issued by a federal agency, it was within the
scope of the CWA section 1323(a) provision subjecting the United States
to liability "for those penalties arising under Federal law."' 2 5 The Lujan
H court summarized the Sierra Club argument as stating that "when the
government has violated a permit issued directly by EPA 'under federal
law,' any confusion regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity in sec26
tion 1323(a) disappears."1
Such an argument is possible because the Court in United States Dep't
of Energy v. Ohio held that "Ohio's argument for treating state-penalty
provisions as arising under federal law . . .fails."' 2 7 The Court thus
appeared to make a distinction between a state-issued permit and a permit issued directly by a federal agency. Such an implied distinction
leaves unanswered the actual meaning of the phrase "civil penalties arising under federal law."' 1 8 The Court speculated on possible reasons
for inclusion of the phrase in the statute, but concluded its discussion by
129
stating that the "question has no satisfactory answer."'
The Tenth Circuit was in a position to carve out an exception to the
holding in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio by affirming the district
court decision. Rather than doing so, the court read the Supreme
Court's ambivalence broadly and concluded that United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio stood for the proposition that "Congress did not legislate an
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity regarding the assessment of
punitive civil penalties against the United States under the Clean Water
0
Act."13
While a disappointing decision for environmental groups, the
court's decision nonetheless is a rather magnanimous attempt at creating uniformity and clarity on this issue. The Tenth Circuit gave no discussion of the fact that the Supreme Court decision in United States Dep'
121. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.
Ct. at 1639).
122. Id. at 316.
123. United States Dept. ofEnergy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. at 1632.
124. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988).
126. Lujan H, 972 F.2d at 316.
127. United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct at 1639.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Lujan H, 972 F.2d at 316.
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of Energy v. Ohio created a roadblock in the path taken by this area of law,
which demanded a complete reversal of the circuit's past direction.
Sierra Club made a valid argument based on the "analytic gymnastics"113 1 the Supreme Court performed to arrive at its conclusion. The
Tenth Circuit indicated that a uniform approach was more important
than a further fragmentation of the issue. Thus, the new direction of law
on this issue appears relatively settled, even if in direct opposition to
precedent. The court concluded that whether a CWA permit is issued by
a state or by the EPA, "the result is the same-no waiver of sovereign
32
immunity."'
Unless Congress disagrees with this new interpretation and clarifies
the CWA, this new direction in the law will ultimately present federal
agencies with more opportunities to use their own discretion. Under
Lujan II, federal agencies are shielded completely from punitive fines for
violations of the CWA. Fines will not accrue, and the agencies will not
be threatened until a court order is actually imposed, making coercive
fines a real possibility.' 3 3 Although the Supreme Court disagreed with
the argument that punitive fines were necessary deterrents, the fact remains that a significant tool capable of forcing agencies to comply with
the Clean Water Act has been lost.
IV.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: HOLY CROSS WILDERNESS
FUND v. MADIGAN

A.

134

BACKGROUND

The Homestake II project is a long-term water development plan
designed to provide the Colorado cities of Colorado Springs and Aurora
(Cities) with additional water.' 3 5 The project involves diverting water
from Cross Creek and Fall Creek in the Holy Cross Wilderness Area to
the Homestake Reservoir through a series of diversions and underground tunnels.13 6 In 1982, the Cities sought a land use easement from
3 7
the Forest Service, requiring it to conduct an environmental analysis.1
The Forest Service prepared a draft Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) analyzing six project alternatives and conducted twenty public
131. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct at 1641 (White, J.,dissenting).
132. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316.
133. United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638. Plaintiff State of Ohio argued that the purpose of punitive fines was "to encourage compliance with comprehensive, federally approved water pollution programs .... [Flederal facility compliance ...
cannot be .. .accomplished without the [punitive] penalty deterrent." Id.
134. 960 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1992).
135. Id. at 1518.
136. Id. The Wilderness Area is managed under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 11311136 (1988). However, due to Congressional intent, the Homestake II project is exempt
from the Wilderness Act's ban on water projects. Id. § 1133(4).
137. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1518. An environmental analysis is a detailed statement of
environmental impact required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") for
any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
...." 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1988). Environmental Impact Statements are submitted to
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEO) before regulations are promulgated. Id.
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hearings on the water project.' 3 8
In 1983, the Forest Service completed its final EIS, concluding that
the Homestake II project would not significantly impact wetlands or
other environmental areas.' 3 9 With this finding, the Forest Service issued its Record of Decision 140 and granted a land use easement. Once
the land use easement had been obtained, the cities next sought a
dredge and fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. 14 1 Rather
than automatically adopting the Forest Service's final EIS, the Corps
conducted an independent review of that statement.14 2 The Corps concluded that the Forest Service had not adequately shown that there
43
would be no wetlands damage.1
The Corps then hired an independent consultant, Aqua Resources,
Inc. (ARI), to study the wetlands impact.14 4 In 1984, ARI's report indicated a potential for wetlands harm.14 5 ARI recommended undertaking
additional studies, requiring pre- and post-construction monitoring and
implementation of measures if deemed necessary by the additional studies.' 46 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) then reviewed the
ARI study and concluded that additional studies should be considered
14 7
before construction of the water diversion project.
Disregarding the advice of ARI as well as the EPA, the Corps chose
not to conduct additional studies, nor did it prepare its own EIS. 148
Rather, it adopted the Forest Service EIS and issued a dredge and fill
permit subject to specific conditions requiring the Cities design a plan
that would prevent wetlands damage in the wilderness area. ' 49 The permit specifically stated that "the applicants shall prevent the loss of
wetlands."' 50
In compliance with this permit condition, the Cities prepared a nine
volume wetlands report and mitigation plan which provided for extensive, long-term monitoring as well as a detailed mitigation plan to prevent wetlands losses and concluded that no wetlands loss would
138. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1518.
139. Id. at 1519.
140. Id.
141. Id, A dredge and fill permit is required "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).
142. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1519.
143. Id. Meanwhile, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had conducted a review and concluded that there would be no detrimental impact on wetlands. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The report concluded that "[t]here is a potential for significant adverse impacts to downstream wetlands in terms of sequentially (over time) lowering the water table
associated with several Cross and Fall creek wetlands." Id.
146. Id. at 1520.
147. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1520.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In the Record of Decision, the Army Corps District Engineer stated, as rationale for issuing the permit but only with the condition, "I intend that these wetlands be
preserved, but I do not wish to unnecessarily prolong the permitting process or restrict the
City's [sic] development of their water rights." Id.
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occur. 15 1 The Corps approved this plan in 1988.152
The Holy Cross Wilderness Fund filed suit in 1985 to set aside the
land use easement as well as the dredge and fill permit, claiming that
both violated NEPA.1 5 3 After trial, the district court concluded that the
Corps did not violate NEPA or any other law. Holy Cross Wilderness
Fund then appealed.' 5 4
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed that there were no violations
of NEPA. The Forest Service final EIS was properly adopted by the
Corps and the Corps' need to seek additional information concerning
the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts was obviated by
the Corps' decision to issue the permit with the condition that no wet55
lands losses occur.1
The court examined separately the issues of the EIS adoption and
permit conditions. First, the court held that the Corps could adopt the
Forest Service final EIS rather than complete another unless it found
substantial doubt as to the adequacy of the final EIS. 15 6 Under these
guidelines the court then looked to the adequacy of the original Forest
Service final EIS. The court could not find that the final EIS, which addressed the impact of the water project on wetlands, lacked a "reasonable, good faith, objective presentation" of adverse environmental
effects. 157 The court then decided that the lack of a detailed mitigation
plan stemmed from the Forest Service's initial decision that the project
would not adversely effect any wetlands areas. 158 The Forest Service
was under no obligation to create a mitigation plan for adversities it did
59
not anticipate. '
Second, the court examined the Fund's argument that the Corps
erred in deciding not to supplement the final EIS after learning from
ARI that additional data were needed. 160 Because experts disagreed on
this issue, the court felt it best to defer to the discretion of the
agency. 16 1 Thus, the court refused to second-guess the agency and
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1521.
154.

Id.

155. Id. at 1526.
156. Id. An agency may adopt a Federal draft or final environmental impact statement
or portion thereof provided that the statement or portion thereof meets the standards for
an adequate statement under these regulations. Id. at 1522; 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a) (1992).
157. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526 (quoting Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088, 1091
(10th Cir. 1983)). Judicial examination is "performed for the limited purpose of ensuring
that the document is a good faith, objective, and reasonable explanation of environmental
consequences that responds to the five topics of NEPA's concern." Johnston, 698 F.2d at
1091.
158. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526-27.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1526. The court also addressed the Fund's arguments under the CWA. See
id. at 1524-25 & 1527-29.
161. Id. at 1527. The Madigan court cited Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1988), which stated that when "specialists express conflicting views,
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could find no basis for holding that the Corps' decision lacked a reasoned evaluation of the new information. 16 2 The court found this especially true in light of the fact that the Corps issued the permit with the
stipulation that no wetlands losses occur. 16 3 This condition apparently
obviated the need for the Corps to prepare a supplemental EIS. 164
C.

Analysis

NEPA requires that a federal agency considering a major action prepare an EIS. 16 5 Under these guidelines the agency is required to discuss
ways to mitigate adverse environmental consequences.' 6 6 However, "it
is 'well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process.' "167 Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council 168 discussed the fact that as long as the agency adequately identified and evaluated the adverse effects of an action, it may
decide that other values outweigh the environmental effects.' 6 9 However, the Court did not minimize the significance of the discussion of
mitigation measures. The Court labeled them an "important ingredient
of an EIS."170
The Tenth Circuit in Holy Cross dealt with a slightly more refined
issue than did the Supreme Court in Robertson. The Fund argued that
the Corps erred in adopting the Forest Service final EIS which did not
contain a detailed mitigation plan. Under a strict application of Robertson, this appears to be a compelling argument. However, the Holy Cross
court distinguished Robertson by showing Forest Service's initial conclusion that there would be no adverse effect on wetlands obviated the
an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified
experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive."
Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Section 4332 of NEPA provides:
[T]o the fullest extent possible .. . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall ...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
165. Id. § 4332(c) (1988).
166. Id.
167. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
168. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
169. Id. at 350.
170. Id. at 351. The Court proceeded to state that an "omission of a reasonably complete discussion of possible mitigation measures would undermine the 'action-forcing'
function of NEPA." Id. at 352.
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need to prepare a detailed mitigation plan.' 7 1
This conclusion presents a potentially large problem in challenging
agency actions under NEPA. While agencies are under no obligation to
adopt a mitigation plan, a discussion of such plans in the EIS is required.17 2 The Tenth Circuit avoided a reversal of the Forest Service
and Corps actions due to the lack of a detailed mitigation discussion in
the Forest Service final EIS in two ways. First, the court deferred to the
173
agency's judgment because of the conflicting opinions of experts.
Second, and most significantly, the court pointed to the fact that the
Corps issued the dredge and fill permit with the stipulation that no wetlands loss occur. 174 The court concluded that, due to this stipulation,
"the Corps no longer needed to evaluate 'reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts' on wetlands, because [the Corps] assumed such impacts [would occur] and essentially guaranteed that the Cities mitigate
those impacts." 175 Under this analysis, the court held that there were
76
no NEPA violations.1
Leaving aside the court's deference to the agencies, the court's acceptance of the Corps' permit stipulation presents two problems. In this
instance the agency concluded that its actions presented no threat of
loss to wetlands and yet also assumed that some adverse impacts were
inevitable. With this type of awkward logic, it seems clear under the
ruling in Robertson that a detailed mitigation discussion is required in a
final EIS.17 7 Also, the court overlooked the fact that Robertson does not
require a mitigation plan merely for environmental loss, but focuses in' 78
stead on "adverse environmental effects." 1
Second, this reasoning leaves open the question of what agencies
must do in similar future cases. The court's language suggests that a
171. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526.
172. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410-11
(1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
173. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1527.
174. Id. at 1526.
175. Id. (emphasis in original).
176. Id.
177. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). Robertson
held that "[i]mplicit in NEPA's demand that an agency prepare a detailed statement on
'any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented' . . . is an understanding that the EIS will discuss the extent to which adverse
effects can be avoided." This rationale is supported by the CEQimplementing regulations
which define mitigation to include:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an
action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its
implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources
or environments.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1992).
178. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
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stipulation attached to a permit will substitute for an adequate mitigation discussion in the agency's final EIS. This reasoning seems contrary
to the goals of NEPA and the accepted interpretation of those goals as
enunciated through cases such as Robertson.
The decision further constricts an already narrow standard of judi17 9
cial review for finding an agency action "arbitrary and capricious."'
The Tenth Circuit showed it was willing to defer to an agency decision
with little inquiry into that agency's rationale. While the arbitrary and
capricious standard is narrow, the court should not automatically defer
as a general rule.' 8 0 The facts showed that the Forest Service found
there would be no wetlands loss, while independent experts and the
Corps' District Engineer in his Record of Decision found a significant
possibility for such adverse impacts. ' 8 ' While the court clearly may not
substitute its judgment for that of an agency, 182 the court must undergo
a review of the agency's decision. Such an inquiry was clearly lacking in
Holy Cross. Such lack of evaluation leaves unclear whether the agency
use of permit stipulations may substitute for EIS mitigation discussions
in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Holy Cross, 183 the Tenth Circuit again showed itself to be ex184
tremely willing to defer to federal agencies under the Chevron rule.
The Supreme Court reinforced this deference in United States Department
of Energy v. Ohio,' 8 5 which compelled the Tenth Circuit to reconsider its
earlier holding in Lujan 1. 86 The Lujan II court reversed Lujan I, refusing to carve out an exception. By so doing, the court further extended
substantial judicial deference to federal agency decisions. Holy Cross
portrayed the court as willing to defer to the agency without undergoing
a proper analysis of the federal agency's reasoning. This lack of inquiry
seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling that the courts
should make an independent inquiry into the agency's interpretations to
ensure that the agency's decision was reasonable. In Daigle, 187 the court
solidified the direction of lower courts on the issue of medical response
costs. The Daigle holding strengthens the emerging trend that CERCLA
179. See Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984).
180. The court should not automatically defer to the agency's express reliance without

carefully reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
181. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1527.
182. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
183.

Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1515.

184. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
Robert D. Comer et al., Note, Recent Developments in Environmentaland NaturalResources Law,
69 DENV. U. L; REV. 997, 1017 (1992).
185. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 98-109.
186. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 76-97.
187. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
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response costs do not extend to medical monitoring for past exposure
to hazardous materials.
Christopher L. Cook

